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                                  NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 06-3104
ADEGOKE OLANIYI; LAMINE SANOU;
SOLANGE CHADDA; OLAH BESSID;
FENELON NORELIEN
 v.
ALEXA CAB CO; TOMORROW FINANCING;
FIRST KEYSTONE; MIKE ETEMAD; CHRIS STEWART;
BANCO POPULAR; RANA CAB CO
Solange Chadda,
                              Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 05-cv-05250)
District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno
__________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 2, 2007
Before: RENDELL, COWEN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges.                     
 





Appellant Solange Chadda, along with four others, filed a complaint and amended
complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
1  We note that only the appeal of appellant Chadda is before the Court.  The
appeals filed by her co-plaintiffs and docketed at C.A. Nos. 06-3105 and 06-3106 were
procedurally terminated by the Clerk without judicial action pursuant to L.A.R. 3.3 and
L.A.R. Misc. 107.1(a).
2
styled as a class action suit seeking damages against numerous defendants for their
alleged violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1964 (“RICO”).  Chadda’s main allegations focused on fraud with respect to certain
mortgage transactions.  Defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaints pursuant to,
inter alia, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (6).  After allowing for the filing of amended
complaints, the District Court conducted two hearings at the conclusion of which it
granted defendants’ motions and dismissed Chadda’s complaint.  This timely appeal
followed.1
We have jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and
exercise plenary review over the District Court’s decision to grant defendants’ motions to
dismiss.  See Petruska v. Gannon University, 462 F.3d 294, 299 and n.1 (3d Cir. 2006). 
We accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences
that can be drawn therefrom.  Id.  We will affirm a dismissal for failure to state a claim if
we can “say with assurance that under the allegations of the pro se complaint, which we
hold to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, it appears
‘beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [her] claim which
would entitle [her] to relief.’”  McDowell v. Delaware State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 189 (3d
Cir. 1996) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)).  For the reasons that
3follow, we will affirm the District Court’s order of dismissal.
Initially, we note our agreement with appellee Banco Popular’s position that the
District Court’s alleged violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 does not warrant relief from this
Court.  Put quite simply, the District Court did not improperly permit Mr. Heartmann St.
Croix to intervene in the proceedings below as asserted by Chadda in her informal
appellate brief.  The record clearly shows that, while the District Court allowed Mr. St.
Croix to offer testimony at one of the hearings, Mr. St. Croix did not seek to intervene in
the underlying proceedings and the court understood that he was not a plaintiff in this
particular lawsuit.  See N.T. from Hearing of 5/16/06 at p. 43.
We further agree with the District Court’s determination that Chadda’s complaint
suffered from numerous fatal deficiencies.  As the District Court noted, to the extent
Chadda and her co-plaintiffs were simply seeking to challenge the decision issued by
Judge Sanchez in Sanou, et al. v. Etemad, E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 05-cv-03871, they were
required to do so by filing a motion for reconsideration in that case or seeking appellate
review of the order of dismissal in this Court.
Additionally, the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.  Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).  The District Courts have jurisdiction
over federal questions, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and actions involving parties of diverse
citizenship when there is a certain minimum amount in controversy.  See 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a).  While the RICO authorizes civil suits by any persons injured in their business or
property by reason of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962, see Kehr Packages, Inc. v.
4Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1411 (3d Cir. 1991), the allegations of mortgage fraud and
identity theft set forth in Chadda’s amended complaint do not state such a claim.  See
Lum v. Bank of America, 361 F.3d 217, 223-24 (3d Cir.2004) (In order to plead a
violation of RICO, a plaintiff must allege “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a
pattern (4) of racketeering activity,” and must satisfy the heightened pleading requirement
of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) where the claim is based on a predicate act of fraud.).  See also
Kehr Packages, 926 F.2d at 1412 (noting that the Supreme Court stressed in H.J. Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989), that a plaintiff must show
“that the racketeering acts are related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of
continued criminal activity.”).
The District Court was thus correct to conclude that Chadda’s complaint fails to
state a claim under its federal question jurisdiction, and that her fraud allegations – which
are between parties who are not diverse –  must be pursued in state court.   See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a)(1);  Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. Hansen, 48 F.3d 693, 696 (3d Cir. 1995)
(recognizing that to satisfy § 1332(a)(1) jurisdiction no plaintiff can be a citizen of the
same state as any defendant).  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s final order
of dismissal.
